The external application of a concept is never equivalent to a theoretical practice. The application changes nothing in the externally derived truth but its name, a re-baptism incapable of producing any real transformation of the truths that receive it. The application of the 'laws' of the dialectic to such and such a result of physics, for example, makes not one iota of difference to the structure or development of the theoretical practice of physics; worse, it may turn into an ideological fetter.2
In short, it seemed to Althusser that the external application of concepts derived from Marx's Capital, or Lenin's work, to diverse fields of study and struggle, did not lead to their true transformation, but rather to an inefficacious 're-baptism' of the field in question and an ideologisation of the conceptual framework imported into it -hence the importance of the continuous demarcation between the truly scientific production of knowledge, and ideology's perpetuation of certain naturalised notions through such constant 're-baptisms' . However, hidden behind this concern with the differentiation between ideology and theory proper, there lies an even more fundamental problem: the question of a theory of the materially new. After all, how could there be a theory which helps to produce, and think, real change? Would its very determinate character, being a determinate theory, not get in the way of the proper apprehension of what is truly novel and, therefore, indeterminate from the standpoint of the situation? Would not a theory of the new, precisely because it has a determinate notion of novelty, ultimately and structurally fail to recognise novel, and surprising, determinations brought about by change and revolutionary transformation?
For Althusser, the Hegelian dialectics was not simply a teleological one, but one in which the contradictory and the indeterminate were always already informed by precisely an unchanging transcendental frame. Idealism -and, ultimately, ideology -is nothing but the substitution of the practico-historical work of conceptualisation of a given transformative practice, for a rigid and definitive 'essentialisation' of its existing state and reliabilities. The fight against idealism is, then, ultimately, the struggle for the proper theoretical apprehension of what revolutionary practices unforeseeably produce in their proper singular historical conjunctures and fields of investigation -the struggle for the local and material production of the determinate indexes of a theory. Althusser concludes, against the reference to Hegel's dialectical framework within Marxism, that 'whether we are dealing with a confrontation with something new in
